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SOME CURRENT THOUGHTS ON CORPORATE
CAPITALIZATION *
CHESTER ROHRLICH **

There is nothing new in the basic legal problems connected with the need of
each new business to somehow or other raise the necessary funds with which
to launch the enterprise. It is primarily because of the flexibility which the corporate form of doing business affords in pooling together for a common business purpose the funds of many persons with diverse financial needs and
objectives, that the corporation has achieved the pre-eminent position which
it occupies. But while the fundamental questions are old, new times, new
decisions and'new statutes serve to emphasize different phases and different
facets of the more permanent problems.' It is the purpose of the writer here to
direct attention to a few considerations that are of current importance in
determining the capitalization 2 of a corporation.
Although, in investment theory, there may be an "optimum capitaliza* The substance of this article was delivered as a lecture by the writer on April 28,
1948, before the Section on Corporations of The Association of the Bar of the City
of New York. The material has been expanded and revised for publication purposes.
** Chester Rohrlich is a member of the law firm of Lehman, Goldmark & Rohrlich
(New York City). He is also a member of the faculty of the New York University Law
School and a member of the Bars of New York and Massachusetts. Mr. Rohrlich has
written extensively and is now completing ORGANIZING BusINESS ENTERPRISES, to be
published by Matthew Bender & Co.

1. This element of flux in corporate finance may not be attributed to the "New Deal,"
although some of its legislative manifestations have had, as other articles in this symposium show, a significant impact on corporation law and practice; see also, Rohrlich,
The New Deal in CorporationLaw, 35 COL. L. Rav. 1167 (1935). In 1910, it was said,
"Methods of corporate finance are continually changing and, as new questions are decided
by the courts, they must necessarily change." Masslich, Financing a New CorporateEnterprise, 5 ILL. L. REV. 70, 86 (1910). And in 1916, Lyon, in introducing the second volume
of his CORPORATION FINANCE, wrote, "The passage of a few years with the varying
economic, social and personal winds, make the facts presented in an old corporation manual
resemble the snows of yesterday."
2. "Capitalization," as we here use the word, is an accounting rather than a legal
term, meaning "the total permanent liabilities of a business, including outstanding
stock." WEsTERs NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1947). See also, DEWING,
THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 58 (4th ed. 1947) ; GERSTENBERG, FINANCIAL
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGMEENT 126 (2d rev. ed. 1945); LINCOLN, APPLIED BUSINESS
FINANCE 96 (5th ed. 1941). ". . . in common financial parlance the long term funded
debt of a corporation is usually regarded as forming part of its capital structure." Comm'r
v. Neustadt's Trust, 131 F. 2d 528, 530 (C.C.A. 2d 1942) ; cf. Anhalt v. Stein, 223 App. Div.
767, 227 N.Y. Supp. 606 (1928). The word is preferable for the purposes of this article
because it is broader than the lawyer's "capital," which correctly used does not include
debt, but it must also be noted that it -is not broad enough to encompass the corporate
surplus which in a very real sense is also part of the owners' investment in the business. The Tennessee Code definition (§ 3735) is very adequately illustrative of the correct legal meaning of "capital": "The capital of every corporation shall be defined
as the sum of the aggregate par value of all shares of stock having par value issued
by the corporation and/or the aggregate amount of consideration received by the corporation for the issuance of shares without par value, together with such additional
amounts, if any, as from time to time by resolution of the board of directors may be
transferred to capital; provided, however, that any corporation may, by resolution of its
board of directors, allocate to surplus, in lieu of capital, the amount or value of any
part of the consideration received for the issuance of shares without par value." Cf.
N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW, §§ 12, 13 (1940).
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tion" for each corporation, s the law allows a very high degree of freedom
of choice, 4 and even as a matter of economics there are many possible "bases"
from which to choose 5 and after one (or more) has been selected its translation into an actual balance sheet invariably involves the application of many
subjective judgments as to present values and future prospects. However, in
finance, no less than in dress, fashion has always played its influential part.
It is difficult to imagine the creation today of corporate structures comparable to those of the "twenties." 6 What is currently significant is that it is no
longer necessary to rely upon rumors as to what "everybody," "they," or "Wall
Street" are doing to find objective standards. A few federal enactments, the
pronouncements of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 7 and certain
requirements of the New York Stock Exchange have all combined to make
available a body of criteria by which to judge any particular capital structure.
It is suggested that the tendency to the i'oluntary acceptance of such standards
by persons not subject to their mandate is not only psychologically "natural,"
but is also, in the opinion of the writer, prudent. Adherence to such standards
makes for readier acceptance in the market and may well prove worthwhile foresight should the corporation at a later date find itself before some
administrative or judicial body.
"How much" is no new question. "The Securities and Exchange Commission has always founded its conclusions as to value primarily on the
premise that 'value' represents a capitalization of prospective earning power
at an appropriate rate which recognizes the risks inherent in the industry
and in the particular enterprise."' The courts have very emphatically accorded
c. XL (1934).
4. State requirement& for industrial corporations (as distinguished from banks; insurance companies and the like) are not significant. Typical are requirements of a
minimum authorized or paid-in capital as a condition precedent to doing business; these
minima range from $500 (OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 8623-37; OKLA. BusiNEss Co0rOATiON Act OF 1947, § 15) through $1,000 (DEL. REV. CODE c. 65, § 5) (1935) ; Ky. Rrv.
STAT. § 271.085 (1943); MASS. GEN. LAWS, C. 156, § 6(e); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3714
(Williams, 1934), to $2,000 (N.J. REv. STAT. § 14:2-3(e) (1936). Very few states have
debt restrictions; but see, Arizona (CODE, § 53-301) limiting debt to two-thirds of capital
3. GRAiA-2% AND DODD, SEcuRITy ANALYSIS

stock and Tennessee (CODE, § 7304) limiting minimum amount of long-term secured
bonds or notes.

5. LINcoLN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 149 et seq.
6. See, A Study of the Promotion and Expansion of "The United Corporation!' under
the Laws of Delaware and what would have been the effect thereon of the Federal

Securities Laws had they been in force at the time, 37 COL. L. REV. 785, 936, 1137 (1937).

7. Within their limited areas the Interstate Commerce Commission [see, SHARFMAN,
ssioN, (1931)] and local public service or utility
commissions have, of course, for years controlled or regulated the capitalization of corTHE I-NTERsTATE CommERcE Co.!

porations subject to their jurisdiction. See, Heilman, The Development by Commissions
of the Principlesof Public Utility Capnitalization, 23 J. PoL. Ecox. 888 (1915).
8. Frank, Epithetical Jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in the Administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 18 N.YU.L.Q.
REv. 317, 341 (1941). See also, Gardner, The S.E.C. and Valuation Under Chapter X,
91 U. OF PA. L. REv. 440, 454 (1943); Comment, Distribution of Securities in Corporate
Reorganization,51 YALE L.J. 85, 88 (1941); Note, Valuation by the S.E.C. in Reorganiations, 55 HA~v. L. REv. 125, 127 (1941).
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primacy to prospective earnings as the base upon which to evaluate an enterprise. 9 When the question as to the "appropriate rate" of capitalization is
reached, general principles are not very helpful, 10 even apart from the influence of ever present "human" factors, from which, it has been suggested,
not even the Securities and Exchange Commission can wholly escape." It has
applied rates varying from about 8% to about 20%, with a predilection. for
the 10% figure. 12 The courts have applied the same range of rates in cases
involving the valuation of intangibles, more particularly "good will," for, tax
purposes.' 3
Consistent with the historic attitude of regulatory commissions, 14 -the
Securities and Exchange Commission has worked in the direction of less debt
and more equity capital.' 6
.
With the possible loss of "insulation from liability" 16 as a penalty for
inadequate equity capital and excessive debt inherent in the "Deep Rock Doctrine," 17 there should, it might appear, now be at work the powerful influence
9. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Group of

Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P.&P.R.Co., 318 U.S. 523 (1943)'; Dudley v.

Mealey, 147 F. 2d 268 (C.C.A. 2d 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 873 (1945).
10. See DEwING, op. cit. supra note 2, at 335-6, where considerations justifying rates
varying from 10% to 100% are set forth.
11. See Gardner, supra note 8, at 454; also 55 HAxv. L. REv. 132-4 (1941).
12. Calkins, Valuation in Corporate Reorganization, 16 NoTR DAME LAW. 18, 27
(1940) ; 51 YALE L.J. at 90 -(1941) ; 55 HARv. L. Rav. 132-4 (1941); Gardner, supra
note 8, at 456.
13. 10 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 59.42 (1943). In a very
recent case (decided Feb. 18, 1948) involving a retail drug-store (owned by a partnership), the Tax Court arrived at the value of its goodwill by taking the average of its
earnings for ten years (1933-1943), allowing a 10% return on tangibles and then capitalizing the remainder at 20%. The Commissioner had taken a five year period (1939-1943),
allowed 8% on tangibles and used a capitalization rate of 15%. Watson v. Comm'r, T.C.M.,
Docket No. 10406; 48.019 P-H MFmo TC (1948). See also, Shunk v. Comm'r, 10 TC
No. 36, Feb. 17, 1948, 1f 10.36 P-H TC 1948.
14. Supra note 7.
15. E.g., In the 'Matter of New England Gas and Electric Ass'n., SEC Holding
Company Act Release No. 6822, Aug. 2, 1946; The Commonwealth & Southern Corporation, 11 S.E.C. 138, aff'd., 134 F. 2d 747 (C.C.A. 3d 1943). See, 10 SEC AN-zN. REP. 99
(1944)..
16. Douglas and Shanki, Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations,
39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929).
17. So called from the name of the subsidiary involved in Taylor v. Standard Gas &
Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). Comment, Right of Parent or Subsidiary to Share With
Other Creditorsin Assets of Associated Corporation on the Latter'sInsolvency, 37 Mica.
L. Rv.440 (1939) ; Israels, The Implications and Limitations of the "Deep Rock" Doctrine, 42 COL. L. REv. 376 (1942) ; Krotinger, The "Deep Rock" Doctrine: A Realistic
Approach to Parent-SubsidiaryLaw, 42 COL.L. REv. 1124 (1942) ; Sprecher, The Conflict
of Equities Under the "Deep Rock" Doctrine, 43 COL. L. REv. 336 (1943); Hornstein,
A .New Forum for Stockholders, 45 COL. L. REv. 35 (1945) ; Note, The Deep Rock Doctrine; Inexorable Command or Equitable Reinedy? 47 COL. L. REV. 800 (1947). Cf. In
re Madelaine, Inc., 164 F. 2d 419 (C.C.A. 2d 1947); Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371;
10 N.E. 2d 259 (1937). The doctrine narrowly stated "is at least this: Where a showing
can be made that a subsidiary corporation having public preferred stockholders [or creditors] was inadequately capitalized from the outset, and was managed substantially in the
interest of its parent, rather than in its own interest, the parent, will 'not, in a bankrupcy or reorganization proceeding affecting the subsidiary, be permitted to assert a claim
as a creditor, except in subordination to the claims of preferred stockholders [and creditors
of.the subsidiary]." Israels, supra at 379.
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of self-interest in support of a conservative balance between debt and equity
in the corporate balance sheet.' 8
But personal interest is not so easily served in this day of many laws.
The in-fluence of the tax laws is strongly in the direction of the smallest possible
eqdty and the largest part of the total capitalizationin the form of debt.' 9
Three aspects of the federal income tax laws suggest this.
Interest paid by a corporation on its outstanding debt is deductible 20 but
not so with respect to dividends paid. 2' Hence, the obvious tax minimization
possibilities in more debt and less equity in the capitalization. Under the temptation of this tax saving, there has been a reluctance to use stocks even
though otherwise indicated. Such other factors have, however, in many instances prevented the use of the ordinary forms of debt obligations. The result
has been myriad variations with many overlapping characteristics so that it is
not always easy to draw the line between the proprietary interest known as a
stock.and the security representing a corporate debt. 22 The decisions by the
Supreme Court 23 in the Kelley 24 and Talbot 26 cases are not very helpful because without "a substantial differentiating factor," 26 it sustained diverse holdings by the Tax 'Court.27 Two later decisions of the Tax Court may therefore

be noteworthy.
18. Although the "Deep Rock Doctrine" has thus far been most commonly applied
in the corporate parent-subsidiary Telationship and there are good reasons of policy for
distinguishing between a corporate parent and individual stockholders [see LATTY, SunSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 196 (1936)], it may not be safely assumed that
the underlying principle is not also applicable to individual stockholders in one-man or in
close corporations. Cf. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). See also Mosher v. Salt
River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 39 Ariz. 567, 8 P. 2d 1077 (1932) ; Dixie Coal Mining
& Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 221 Ala. 331, 128 So. 799 (1930).
There is an extensive non-legal literature on the subject of what constitutes an
appropriate capitalization. One of the latest discussions is in GUTIMANN AND DOUGALL,
CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY C. 11 (2d ed.41948).
19. See generally, Schlesinger, "Thin" Incorporations:Income Tax Advantages and
Pitfalls,61 HARV. L. Rxv. 50 (1947); Semmel, Tax Consequences of Inadequatc Capitalication, 48 COL. L.Rzv. 202 (1948).
20. INT. REv. CODE, 52 STAT. 460 (1938) ; 26 U.S.C.A. § 236 (1940).
21. See generally, 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 26.10 (1942).
22. Comm'r v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 141 F. 2d 467, 469 (C.C.A. 1st 1944). See also,
Northern Fire Apparatus Co. v. Comm'r, 11 B.T.A. 355 (1928). For general discussions
of hybrid securities, see Berle, The Vanishing Distinction Between Creditors and Stockholders, 76 U. oF PA. L. REv. 814 (1928) ; Hansen, Hybrid Securities: A Study of Sccurfties which Combine Charicteristicsof Both Stocks and Bonds, 13 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv.

407 (1936) ; Comment, Status of Holders of Hybrid Securities: Stockholders or Creditors? 45 YALE L.J. 907 (1936) ; Uhlman, The Law of Hybrid Securities, 28 WASn. U.L.Q.
182 (1938).
23. 326 U.S. 521 (1946); Comment, 44 MiCH. L. REV. 827 (1946). Historically,
the greatest significance in these opinions may well lie in the cautionary dictum of Mr.
Justice Reed: "As material amounts of capital were invested in stock, we need not consider the effect of extreme situations such as nominal stock investments and an obviously
excessvie debt structure." 326 U.S. 521, 526 (1946).
24. John Kelley Co. v. Comm'r, 1 TC 457, rev'd, 146 F. 2d 466 (C.C.A. 7th 1944),
re-'d, supra note 23.
25. Talbot Mills Co. v. Comm'r, 3 TC 95, aff'd, 146 F. 2d 809 (C.C.A. 1st 1944),
aff'd, supra note 23.
26. Mr. Justice Rutledge, 326 U.S. at 533 (1946).
27. Any discussion of the Dobson rule (320 U.S. 489) is outside the scope of this
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In the first of these two recent cases, 28 the deduction was sustained. The
taxpayer-corporation owned real estate which was under long-term lease, the
lease containing a renewal option. The debentures in question stipulated for
their maturity some two weeks following the expiration date of the original
lease but contained a proviso for their extension for an equivalent term in
the event of the renewal of the lease. Because of this provision, the Commissioner argued that the maturity date of the debentures was uncertain and
that they did not therefore constitute debt obligations. Thi Tax Court rejected this contention, and distinguished the case before it from its earlier
decision in 1432 Broadway Corporation29 wherein it had held the payments
non-deductible, on the following factors, inter alia, which were there present:
(1) "Interest" was payable only (a) at the uncontrolled discretion of
the voting trustees of the capital stock, (b) out of "surplus income,"
and (c) provided that cash or liquid investments were not less than
$75,000.00.
(2) The outstanding "debentures" represented 124.5% of the net value
of the corporation's assets and had been authorized to the extent
*of 160% thereof.
(3) "Debenture principal and interest" were subject and subordinate to
the claims of all contract creditors.
The Court stressed that in the case before it, per contra, "the interest
was payable monthly at all events." 30
In the latter of these two cases, 3 the deduction was disallowed. In that
case the sole security holder received in exchange for property having a value
of "at least" $250,200.00 the total initial capitalization of the corporation
consisting of a 99-year "income debenture" in the amount of $250,000.00 and
bearing interest at the rate of 8% per annum, and 200 shares of the par
value of $1.00 each. The "debenture," both as to principal and interest, was
subordinate to all other debts of the corporation, and the "interest," although
cumulative (without interest on accumulations), was payable only "if and to
the extent there are 'net earnings' available." In determining the availability of
$(net earnings," the corporation was authorized to deduct from gross income
"all such reserves as the board of directors of the company, in their absolute
discretion, may determine to be necessary or advisable to provide for the
future operations of the Company." In concluding that the "debenture" was
"inall but name redeemable preferred stock," the Tax Court relied on the
article; see, Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57

HAtv.L. REv. 753 (1944).
28. Cleveland Adolph Mayer

Realty Corp. v. Comnm'r, 6 TC 730 (1946), rev'd on
other grounds, 160 F. 2d 1012 (C.C.A. 6th 1947).
29. 4 TC 1158 (1945), aff'd, 160 F. 2d 885 (C.C.A. 2d 1947).
30. 6 TC at 740 (1946).
31. Swoby Corp. v. Comm'r, 9 TC 887, No. 118 (1947).
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facts and provisions which have been mentioned and additionally stressed tile
fact that no loaan had been made to the corporation. Pursuing a lead suggested
by the Supreme Court,3 2 the Tax Court refused to find that, under the circumstances, the debenture had "a definite maturity date in the reasonabl'
future."
The second tax incentive towards undercapitalization 33 lies in the threat
of Section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code. 34 Since, basically, imposition of
the Section 102 penalty u necessitates a finding that 'there has been an unreasonable accumulation of profits, it is clear that this point is not as quickly
reached in the case of a "poor" corporation as it is in the case of a corporation
fully capitalized to meet all its present and anticipated financial requirements.gG
Whether the practice of deliberately organizing initially with a low equity
and a large debt to accomplish this very end of retaining earnings undistributed
37
will not invoke a judicial reaction remains to be seen.
The third tax consideration which suggests the desirability of a small
capital and a large debt is present only in the case of a closely-held corporation. 38 In the absence of a ready market for his stock, the prudent investor in
a close corporation not infrequently looks forward to the withdrawal of his
investment, in whole or in part, without liquidation of the business, and, if possible, without the payment of ordinary income taxes involved in the receipt
of dividends.3 9 The statutory hurdle is Section 115 (g) of the Interhal Revenue
32. Johi Kelley Co. v. Comm'r, supra note 23 at 526.
33. Both as defined in note 2, supra, and also in the sense of "capital."
34. See, Rig. 111, § 29.102; Rudick, Section 102 and Personal Holding Companiy
Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 49 YALE L.J. 171 (1939); "70% Distribution
of Profits: Section 102 under Post-War Conditions" (C.C.H., 2d ed. 1946) ; Lasser and
Holzman, The "102" Cases, 3 TAX L. REV. 119 (1947) ; Cary, Accumulations Beyond the
Reasonable Needs of the Business: The Dilemma of Section 102 (c), 60 HARV. L. REv.
1282 (1947); Landman, Concepts of Section 102, 26 TAXES 19 (1948). See also three
lectures by'Schorr, Miller and George, 6 N.Y.U. Iics'T. FED. TAX. (1948).
35. 27XA% on the first $100,000 and 38'A% on the excess.
36. E.g., De Mille Productions, 30 B.T.A. 826 (1934); Wean Eng. Co., 2 T.C.M. 510
(1943) ; Coca Cola Bottling Works v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 992 (M.D. Tenn. 1944) ;
Lane Drug Co., 3 T.C.M. 394 (1944); General Smelting Co., 4 TC 313 (1944); Syracuse Stamping Co., 4 T.C.M. 371" (1945); Universal Steel Co., 5 TC 627 (1945). It may
also be observed that a conservative dividend policy will find greater tolerance in the
case of a new corporation than in the case of an established corporation having a background of actual experience upon which to forecast the future; e.g., Lane Drug' Co.,
supra.

37. Cary, supra note 34, at 1303. Cf. caveat by MrL. Justice Reed, in another connection, 326 U.S. at 526 (1946), sypra, note 23; also see, Lion Clothing Co., 8 TC 1181 (1947).
38. To i lesser, but nevertheless very substantial extent, this is also true of the other
two tax considerations which we have here discussed. "It is submitted that the time is
ripe for a sharper division of corporation law into two parts, one dealing with the large
publicly owned corporations and the other with close corporations." ROHRLIc-, LAW
AND PRACTICE IN CORPORATE CONTROL 215 (1933) ; also 35 COL. L. REv. at 1174 (1935).
In addition to the material there cited, see, Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law," 28 CORN. L.Q. 313 (1943).
39. The importance of this factor is measured, of course, by the difference between
the investor's income tax bracket and the 25% current maximum rate applicable to longterm capital gains. For collection of cases, see Note, 170 A.L.R. 1392 (1947).
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Code4 0 The use of "bonds" or "debentures" instead of "stock" affords a literal
escape from the impact of that provision, but query whether debt obligations
which do not meet the test of Section 23 (b) 41 might not also be held to be
"stock" within the meaning of 115 (g),42
An economic condition which in recent years has, in many instances, made
undercapitalization feasible has been the large reservoir of funds in the hands
of insurance companies, universities, and similar institutions, seeking profitable
investments. The use of long-term leases, with ownership of the real estate in
such institutional investor and the operating business as tenant, rather than
direct fee ownership by the business entity and the investor as mortgagee, is
one method whereby this condition has been availed of to keep not only the
capitalization down but even the balance sheet liabilities low, because future
rent obligations are not ordinarily shown as liabilities on the balance sheet. 43
It will be remembered that an appropriatefuinction of corporate capitali-ation is the distributin of the "control" of the corporation as well as of its
property and profits and- losses. Although state statutes quite freely grant
the right to issue non-voting stocks, 44 pressure against their use is substantial. 5
Several of the newer federal statutes restrict the use of non-voting stocks.
Under the Reorganization Act, the reorganized corporation is prohibited from

issuing non-voting stock.4 6 The Public Utility Holding Company Act points
in the same direction.47 And the Investment Company Act requires that, with
40. "If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or not such stock was
issued as a stock dividend) at such time and in such manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part essentially equivalent to the
distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed in redemption or cancellation
of the stock, to the extent that it represents a distribution of earnings or profits ac-

cumulated after February 28, 1913, shall be treated as a taxable dividend."
41. Supra, notes 20-31.
42. See, Emil Stein, 46 B.T.A. 135 (1942); Bertram Meyer, 5 TC 165 (1945).
43. The form of the transaction may to some extent be influenced by the investment powers of the institution. Although in a few states insurance companies were free
to engage in such transactions because of the absence of statutory restrictions, in the
majority of the states enabling legislation was required. Virginia was the first to enact
it in 1942 (VA. CODE ANN. § 4258a (1942), added by Laws of 1942, Ch. 91) and
many states have since done so. For a good discussion of this practice, see, Levy, The
"Trend of Corporations to soll their Real Estate to Institutional Investors, 8 MORTGAGE
BANKERS, No. 2, p. 11, No. 3, p. 2 (1947). See also, GUTHMANN AND DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 571-2 (1940).

.44. Illinois is an outstanding exception; see, People cx rel. Watseka Telephone Co.
v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922). A few states insist upon minimum voting rights in respect of fundamental corporate changes.
45. For earlier studies of "the separation of ownership from control," see BERLE
AND MFANS, THF MODERN CORPORATIONS AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); RoHRLicH,
LAW AND PRACTICE IN CORPORATE CONTROL (1933).

46. § 216 (12) ; 11 U.S.C.A. § 616 (12) (a). It has been held that a voting trust -is
not precluded. In re Quaker City Cold Storage Co., 71 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1947). See
generally; Krotinger, Management and Allocation of Voting Power in Corporate Reorganizations,41 COL. L. REV. 646 (1941).
47. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79g.(c), 79k(a). See 'Meck and Cary, Regulation of Corporate
Finance and Management Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
52 HARv. L. REv. 216, 224 (1938).
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stated exceptions, all newly issued stock be voting stock. 48 Since 1926, the New
York Stock Exchange has refused to list non-voting common stock.49
The same opposition to the denial of voting rights has carried over to
preferred shares, but, in view of the more ancient tradition involved, has been
effective to a far lesser degree. The Securities and Exchange Commission generally requires (e.g., under the Public Utility Holding Company Act) 60 that
preferred stock have "the right to elect a majority of the board of directors
in the event of default in the payment of four quarterly preferred stock dividends and certain voting rights in connection with the following matters:
the issuance of short-term debt in excess of prescribed amounts, mergers and
consolidations, the authorization of any class of stock ranking prior to or
on a parity with the outstanding preferred stock, the amendments of the
charter to change the express terms of the preferred stock in any substantially
prejudicial manner, the issuance of authorized but unissued preferred stock." 51
The New York Stock Exchange has not as yet gone quite as far as the
Commission but it will not list new preferred stocks which do not provide
at least the following minimum voting rights:
. The right of the preferred stock, voting as a class, to elect not less
than two directors after default of the equivalent of six quarterly
dividends.
2. The affirmative approval of at least two-thirds of the preferred stock,
voting as a class, as a prerequisite to any charter or by-law amendments altering materially any existing provision of such preferred
52
stock.
The various federal statutes which have already been referred to aim
to set up an "ideal" capital stock structure to consist of one class of voting
stock. This results in a presumption against, where no absolute prohibition
48. § 18 (i) 0) ; 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-18(i). See Note, The Investment Company Act
of 1940, 41 COL. L. REv. 269, 284 (1941).
49. Quoted from May 4, 1940, Statement of Listing Requirements as to Preferred
Stock Voting Rights. "In broad principle," the New York Curb Exchange also, but less
inflexibly, adheres to a similar policy (see statement of Policy of Committee on Listing
re Voting Rights, as modified November 12, 1946). Examples could be cited to illustrate
that it is evidently still possible by the skillful use of the device of classifying stocks to
deprive listed voting stock of effective control. Cf. PuBLic UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY
AcT (supra, note 47), § 1 (b) (3), 49 STAT. 804 (1935). Nor does the election of directors by preferred and common stockholders voting separately as classes necessarily violate The Investment Company Act requirement of "equal voting rights." In re The
Solvay American Corporation, S.E.C., Investment Company Act, Release No. 1165, April
13, 1948. For discussions of the rights and obligations of "management stock," see Berle,
Non-Voting Stock and "Bankers' Control," 39 HAv. L. Rav. 673 (1926) ; Wood, The
Status of Management Stockholders, 38 YALE L.J. 57 (1928).
50. Supra, note 47.
51. 10 S.E.C. ANN. REP. 103 (1944). See also, Note, Voting Rights of Preferred
Stockholders Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 51 YAL, L.J. 138
(1941). In re The Solvay American Corporation, supra note 49.
52. Statement of May 4, 1940, supra note 49.
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exists, the use of preferred shares.53 It is not the purpose here to prolong
the debate as to the justification for using a security which "is neither fish,
fowl, nor good red herring" 54 nor to examine the truth of the conclusion
that "Heads, the common stockholder wins; tails, the preferred stockholder
loses." 55 The writer does, however, want to direct attention to one current
aspect of preferred stock, namely, the vanishing distinction between cumulative and non-cumulative stocks.

Until recent years, the right of holders of cumulative preferred stock
to receive all dividend arrears was regarded, legally, 56 as a vested right not
easily dislodged. A good expression of this attitude is to be found in Keller
v. Wilson & Co. 57 The Delaware Chancellor *there said:
The State is concerned also with the welfare of those who invest their money,
the very essence of generation, in corporate enterprises. Some measure of protection should
be accorded them. While many interrelations of the State, the corporation and the
shareholders may be changed, there is a limit beyond which the State may°.not go.
Property rights may not be destroyed; and when the nature and character of the right
of a holder of cumulative preferred stock to unpaid dividends, which have accrued thereon
through passage of time, is examined in a case where that right was accorded protection
when the corporation was formed and the stock was issued, a just public policy, which
seeks the equal and impartial protection of the interests of all, demands that the right be
regarded as a vested right of property secured against destruction by the Federal and
State Constitutions.

However, this seemingly impregnable property-"inviolable" 5 8-right
was finally breached with full legal sanction in a number of states as the
result of a combination of legal ingenuity, judicial tolerance and legislative
encouragement. This result was first accomplished by the creation of a new
senior security and the "voluntary" exchange of the old preferred stock..9
53. The desire of the common stock for "leverage" is no sufficient justification for
the use of preferred stock. The Commonwealth & Southern Corp., 11 S.E.C. 44, aff'd
sub. norn. Commonwealth & Southern Corp. v. S.E.C. 134 F. 2d 747 (C.C.A. 3d 1943).
When allowed, preferred stock should-from the point of view of the corporation-be
callable. Matter of the United Light and Railways Co., S.E.C., Holding Company Act Release No. 7951, 1947; and must have various protective provisions. 10 S.E.C. ANN. REP.

99, 1944.

54. HOAGLAND, Co0poRA-zIoN FINANCE 83 (2d ed. 1938).
55. GRAHA.NK AND DODD, Op. cit. supra note 3 at 163.
56. "In practice, the chance of collecting, in cash, accumulated dividends [has always
been] inversely proportional to the size of the accumulation." HOAGLAND, op. cit. supra

note 54, at 57.

57. 21 Del. Ch. 391, 412, 190 Atl. 115, 125 (1936). See also Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch.-407, 197 AtI. 489 (1937) ; Buckley v. Cuban American Sugar Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 322, 19 A. 2d 820 (1940); Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., 184
N.Y. 257, 263, 77 N.E. 13 (1906) ; Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 214 N.C. 806, 200
S.E. 906 (1939). Cf. Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, Inc., 285 N.Y. 500, 35 N.E.
2d 618 (1941), noted 19 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 196 (1942).
58. Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., supra note 57.
59. See, Shanik v. White Sewing Machine Corp., 15 A. 2d 169. (Del. Ch.. 1940);
Johnson v. Fuller, 121 F. 2d 618 (C.C.A. 3d 1941) ; Note, Corporate Recapitalization by
Charter Amendment, 46 YALE L.J. 985 (1937) ; Peters, The Effect of New Prior Preference Stocks Upon the Right to Accrued Cmltative Dividends, 12 U. or CN. L. REv. 576
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"The apple that cannot be picked can, nevertheless, be shaken down." 60 The
only restraint upon this form of recapitalization, absent controlling contractual
restrictions, is seemingly the requirement that it must be "fair"-but, in
Dela,;are, at any rate, "to be held unfair it must amount to at least constructive fraud." 6W Then came the ingenious device of complete elimination of
the accumulation by means of a consolidation or merger-valid even if with
62
a wholly owned subsidiary especially created for the purpose. And finally,
the .constitutionality of a direct elimination of the accumulation by a recapitali63
zation under an appropriately phrased enabling act has been sustained. Thus,
in a substantial number of leading jurisdictions, the shift "from vested right
to mirage" is now complete in so far as cumulative preferred stocks are con64
cerned.
Operating in the opposite direction, but far less successfully, has been
an attempt to improve the legal status of non-cumulative preferred stock.
The inherent weakness of this type of stock is obvious and has long been the
subject of comment, 65 but nothing was done about it until the New Jersey
(1938); Note, Elimination of Accrued Preferred Dividends by Charter Amendment, 26
L REv. 387 (1942) ; Note, IntraclassDiscriminationin the Elimination of Accrued
Dividends, 55 HARv. L. Rxv. 1196 (1942). Also articles cited infra notes 60-64.
60. Becht, The Power to Remove Accrued Dividends by Charter Amendment, 40
COL. L. REv. 633, 639 (1940).
61. Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 146 F. 2d 701 (C.C.A. 3d 1944). Cf. Kamena
v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 133 N.J. Eq. 214, 31 A. 2d 200 (1943), aff'd, 134 N.J. Eq. 359, 35
A. 2d 894 (1944). See Note, The Burden Placed on. Minority Stockholders by the Delaware "Gross Unfairness" Rule Applied in Corporate Reorgani-ations, 20 TEamP. L.Q.
123 (1946) ; Comment, The Fairand Equitable Test in Recapitalizations,45 lxcii L. Rrv.
183 (1946).
62. Hubbard, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 42 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Pa. 1941) ; Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A. 2d 331 (1940); Hottenstein v.
York Ice Mach. Corp., 136 F. 2d 944 (C.C.A. 3d 1943); Zobel v. American Loco. Co.,
182 Misc. 323, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 33 (1943) ; Anderson v. Int. Min. & Chem. Corp., 295 N.Y.
343, 67 N.E. 2d 573 (1946) ; Langfelder v. Universal Laboratories, 163 F. 2d 804 (C.C.A.
3d 1947). See Note, Scaling-Down of Arrearages on Cumulative Preferred Stock, 4 U.
oF Cm. L. Rav. 645 (1937); Note, Elimination of Accrued Dividends in, Corporate Reconstruction, 89 U. oF PA. L. REv. 789 (1941); Comment, Abrogation of Prefcrred
Dividend Arrearages by Charter Amendment, Merger, or Consolidation, 39 Mixcu. L.
REv. 1201 (1941).
63. McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 253 (1945); cf. Davison
v. Parke Austin & Lipscomb, Inc., supra note 57. As to retroactive validity of such
enabling legislation, compare, Wheatley v. A. . Root Co., 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E.
2d 187 (1946). For typical enabling legislation, in addition to New Jersey (Kamena v.
Janssen Dairy Corp., supra note 61), New York (McNulty v. IV. & J. Sloane, supra) and
Ohio (Wheatley v. A. I. Root Co., supra) see as to Virginia [VA. CODE ANN., § 3780
(1942) ], and Wisconsin [Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566, 280 N.W. 688
(1938), noted 6 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 104 (1938)].
The status of accrued dividends in reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Act is beyond the scope of this article; see 6 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §§ 2.05, 11.06 (1947).
64. Dodd, Accrued Dividends in Delaware Corporations-From Vested Right to
-Mirage, 57 HARv. L. Ray. 894 (1944). See also, 'Meck, Accrued Dividends on Conjulative
Preferred Stocks: The Legal Doctrine, 55 HARv. L. REv. 71 (1941).
65. E.g., Berle, Non-Cumulatie Preferred Stock, 23 COL. L. REV. 358 (1923). In
sympathizing with the lot of the non-cumulative preferred stockholder, it must however
not be overlooked that there is evidence to support the conclusion that in the large majority of instances they have not been discriminated against; see, Spal, The Treatment
of.Noncumulative PreferredShareholders %vithregard to Dividends, 15 JouR. or Bus. or
U. OF CLr. 248 (1942).
MINN.
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courts, seizing upon helpful statutory language,68 developed what has come
to be known as the "Dividend Credit Theory" 67 Most -succinctly stated, this
theory requires that if in any year in respect of which full dividends were
not paid on the non-cumulative preferred stock, the net earnings of that year
were in excess of the dividend paid, such excess of earnings must, to the
extent legally available for the payment of dividends, 68 be used to pay preferred dividends before a dividend may be paid on the common stock even
though full dividends have been paid on the preferred for the subsequeit year
in which it is proposed to pay dividends on the common stock. 69
Some writers seem to have accepted the view that the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Wabash Railway Co. v. Barclay,1 ° has com-

pletely forestalled the further development and application of the dividend
credit theory.71 This is not necessarily so. The Supreme Court did say:
We believe that it has' been the common understanding of lawyers and business
men that in the case of non-cumulative stock entitled only to a dividend if declared out
of annual profits, if those profits are justifiably applied by the directors to capital im.provements and no dividend is declared within the year, the claim for that year is gone
and cannot be asserted at a later date'

But this view has been sharply criticized 73 and the 'decigii6n of a court
66. We do not regard that particular statutory provision as of the essence but prefer
to regard the decisions as evidencing a generally applicable principle. See Comment, The
Rights of Non-CGntulative PreferredStockholders in Undivided Profits, 34 YALE L.J. 657
(19.25).
67. A broad and categorical statement of the theory may be found in Berle, supra
note 65, and. iiire limited statements in the opinion of Circuit Judge Mant6n in Barclay
v. Wabash Ry. Co., 30 F. 2d 260, 262 (1929) (rev'd, infra note 70) and in the casenote
in 14 M Nx.L. REv. at 418-419. Without so denominating it, Kehl states the theory as
follows: "When the corporation has earnings in any one year adequate to meet noncumulative dividends, but decides to pass the same, the non-cumulative holders should
be recognized as having an equity in the surplus thus retained, entitling them to payment
of such dividends ahead of common when dividends are proposed to be paid out of
accumulated surplus in later years." KEHL, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS 198-9 (1941).
68. Lich v. United States Rubber Co., 39 F. Supp. 675 (D.N.J. 1941); aff!d, 123 F.
2d 145 (C.C.A. 3d 1941); Comments, 26 MINN. L, REv. 117 (1941), 55 HIARv. L. REv. 678
(1942). Non-cumulative preferred dividends ate not deemed "earned so long as there
remains a deficit from losses sustained in prior years. National Newark & Essex Co. v.
Durant Motor Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 213,_1 A. 2d 316 (1938),.aff'd, 125 N.J. Eq. -435, 5 A.
2d 767 (1939). Earnings of subsidiary not declared and paid as dividends .will not be
deemed earnings of parent. Cintas v. American Car & Foundry Co., 131 NJ..Eq. 419, 25
A. 2d 418 '(1942), aff'd, 132 N.J. Eq. 460, 28 A. 2d 531 (1942).
F,
69. Day -v.United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 95 N.J.. Eq. 39; -123 Atl.
546 (1924), aff'd, 96 -N.J. Eq. 736, 126 Atl. 302 (1924). See also, Bassett v. United States
Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 539, 73 Atl.-514 (1909) ; -Morgao v. United
States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 95 N.J. Eq. 389, 123 Atl. 54 (1924.)
NJ.
Nff'd;96
Eq. 698, 126 Atl. 329 (1924); Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 103 (Sup. Ct. .1942), aff'd,
265 App. Div. 919, 39 N.Y.S. 2d 412, aff'd, 292 N.Y. 552, 54 N.E. 2d .683 (1944).
70. 280 U.S. 197 (1930).
71. E.g., DEWiNG, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 149.
72. Supra, note 70 at 203.
73. Hicks, The Rights of Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock-A Doubtful Decision
by the United States Supreme Court, 5 TEmP. L.Q. 538 (1931); Lattin,.Is Non-Confdafive Preferred Stock Fin
Fact Preferred? 25, ILL. L. Ray. -148 (1930). See -also casenote,
14 MIN.
. REv. 417 (1930).
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below has left a mark which has not been entirely obliterated3 4 With the passing of Swift v. Tyson, 76 the state courts may feel freer to re-examine the
question on its merits.7 6
Even if the "dividend credit theory" remains a minority view, the renewed consideration of the plight of the non-cumulative preferred stockholder engendered by its formulation has suggested another possible line of
relief.
While it is generally stated that the rule that the matter of the declaration of dividends is within the discretion of the board of directors applies
to preferred dividends, non-cumulative and cumulative, as well as to common
dividends,7 7 a refinement of the analysis upon which these principles are
grounded may well lead to a judicial acceptance of the view that the bona-fide
discretion of directors in the payment of non-cumulative preferred dividends
is limited to questions of time-when should a dividend be declared-but does
not carry with it the same freedom to divert to junior securities surplus
profits which in equity should have reasonably gone to the non-cumulative
78
preferred stockholders.
It is hardly necessary to recall expressly that subject only to a very few
statutory requirements, the rights of security holders are matters of contract
and the judicial questions therefore ones of construction. It lies accordingly
with the skilled draftsman, using "the utmost precision available to legal
language" 79 to abrogate or invoke the preferred stock theories to which we
have called attention. But in doing so, it must not be forgotten that "while an
unreasonable contract is a legal possibility, courts will normally struggle
against construction leading to such a result." 80
There remains to mention but one more topic seemingly of current interest in the matter of corporate capitalization. That is as to the iuse of no-par
value stock.
When New York, in 1912, led the way in legalizing no-par stock, 8' it
was seized upon as affording the only safe way of accomplishing certain of
74. 30 F. 2d 260 (C.C.A. 2d 1929).
75. 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842), overruled by Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
76. Cf. Joselin v. Boston & M.R. Co., 274 Mass. 551, 175 N.E. 156 (1931).
77. New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad v. Nickals, 119 U.S. 296 (1886);
Morse v. Boston and M.R.R. Co., 263 Mass. 308, 160 N.E. 894 (1928). See generally
Stevens, The Discretion of Directors in the Distribution of Non-Cumnulative Preferred
Dividends, 24 Go. L.J. 371 (1936); Stevens, Rights of Non-Cumulative PreferredStockholders, 34 CoL- L. Ray. 1439 (1934).
78. See KEHL, op. cit. supra note 67, § 66. Also dicta in Titus v. Piggly Wiggly
Corp., 2 Tenn. App. 184, 204 (1925).

79. DmviNG, op. cit. supra note 2 at 151.
80. Berle, supra note 65 at 359.
81. Nebraska has not followed. Its Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 6) requires that
"all stock shall have a face par value; and all stock in the same corporation shall be of
equal par value." A fev states (e.g., Wisconsin-STAr. § 182.14) deny the privilege
to preferred stock.
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the objectives of corporate promoters, 8 2 primarily immunity against shareholders' liability on watered stock.83 However, it is now quite clear that this
is not necessarily so and that low par value shares serve many of the same
purposes as well.8 4 Coupled with wider recognition of this fact and of the
necessity, even apart from statutory requirements,8 5 for dollar values being
attributed to assets and shares for balance sheet purposes, 6 certain other circumstances have served to minimize the use of no-par shares. _
One hundred dollar par is no longer traditional and shares with a very
low or even nominal par value are not only legal but respectable.8 These low
par value shares effectively serve the same purposes as no-par shares and, in
addition, under many tax statutes result in savings. These statutes not infrequently attribute to no-par shares, for purposes of computing organization,
original issue, and transfer taxes, an arbitrary value and without regard to
the fact that some of the consideration may represent paid-in surplus and not
82. The term is not used with any odious overtones. "The promoter performs
a public service whenever he produces a successful concern [without abusing the interests
of investors, consumers or of the general public]. . . . he either creates a new demand
that helps us do our business more readily, or to live more comfortably, or he supplies
older utilities in a cheaper way, or he saves the ruining Wastes of competition with its
long trail of duplications, unfiecessary advertising, and similar extravagances. The promoter has been much maligned. He is not a prestidigitator. Rufus Wallingford no more
represents the real type of promoter than Sherlock Holmes represents the true type of
detective. The true promoter may have his moments of elegant ease, but he knows what
real work is ... the promoter's work of discovery, assembling, and financing is a matter
of close attention to details." GERSTENBERG, op. cit. supra note 2 at 4.
83. See generally, Cook, "Watered Stock"--Cozmmissions--".BIte Sky Laws"--Stocks
Without Par Value, 19 MicH L. REV. 583, 7 A.B.A.J. 534 (1921) ; Pierson, Stock Having
No Par Value, 17 ILL. L. REv. 173 (1922); Ballantine, Nonpar Stock-Its Use and
Abuse, 57 Am. L. REV. 233 (1923); Bonbright, The Dangers of Shares Without Par
Value, 24 COL. L. REv. 449 (1924) ; Berle, Problems of Non-par Stock, 25 OL. L. REV.
43 (1925); Clay, Shares Without Par Value, 13 Ky. L.J. 275 (1925); Mitchell, Capitalization of Corporations Issuing Shares Without Par Value, 11 A.B.A.J. 377 (1925);
Masterson, Considerationi for Non-Par Shares and Liability of Subscribers and Stockholders, 17 TEX. L. Ray. 247 (1939). ROBBINS, No PAR STOCK (1927); WICKERSHAM,
STOCK WITHOUT PA

VALUE (1927); WILDMAN AND POWELL, CAPITAL STOCK WITH-

OUT PAR VALUE (1928).
84. See Israels, Problems of Par and No-ParShares: A Reappraisal,47 COL. L. REV.
1279 (1947).
85. E.g., CAL. COR. CODE § 1900, DEL. REv. CODE c. 65 (Corp. Law), § 14 (1935);
FLA. STAT. § 612.21 (1941); ILL. Bus. CORP. AcT § 19 as amended (1935); MASS. ANN.
LAws, c. 158, § 33 (1933) ; MIcH. GEN. CoRP. Ac § 20 as amended (1937); N.Y. STOCK
COR'. LAW §§ 12, 13 (1940) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 3725 (Williams, 1934); Wis. STAT.
§ 182.14 as amended (1945).
86. "Unless it proves feasible to adopt a non-par balance sheet, as well as a nonpar stock certificate, that is, unless a form of financial statement can be devised which
does away with pecuniary valuations of the fixed assets by interested parties, we are
still faced with the same problem [of deception], though in a somewhat different form,
that presents itself in the case of an overissue of par-value shares." DODD, STOCK WATERING 304 (1930). Cf. Item 2 (i) of Instructions as to Financial Statements issued by
Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to Forms S-2 arid S-3 under the
Securities Act.
87. BERLE AND WARREN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANI-

ZATIONs-CoRORATzoNS 313 (1948).
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capital.8 8 The impact of these taxes can generally be .substantially reduced by
the use of a lower "valued" par stock.
And moreover, some of the federal legislation which we have already
mentioned as designed to bring about "ideal" corporate capital structures, restrict, within their purview, the use of no-par shares. 8 9 The Securities and
Exchange Commission has said that "as a general rule common stock should
be of par value," 90 but it has from time to time exercised its discretion to
permit the use of no-par shares. 91
In presenting the foregoing aspects presently germane on the subject
of corporate capitalization, no attempt has been made to be exhaustive. The
purpose of the writer has been merely to suggest some factors which should
not be overlooked.
88. E.g., INT. REv. CODE, § 1802 (a); Calif. Gov. Code § 122.1 as amended; CoiN.
GEN. STATS. § 3481; Dux. FRANCHisE TAX LAW c. 6, § 64; N.Y. TAx LAW, § 180. Cf.
TENN. CODE Amn. § 1248.143 (Williams, 1934).
89. E.g., PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY Acr, § 7 (c).
90. In 'the Matter
Act Release No. 5745,
91. In the Matter
Cary, supra note 7, at

of Northern States Power Company, S.E.C. Holding Company
C.C.H.-Dec. 1175,538 (1945).
of Northern States Power Company, supra note 90; Meck and
221-224.

